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DERUNGS V. WAL-MART STORES:
ANOTHER DOOR SHUT-A FEDERAL
INTERPRETATION EXCLUDING
BREASTFEEDING FROM THE SCOPE OF A
STATE'S SEX DISCRIMINATION
PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
What is a mother to do when her infant cries for breast milk as
she pushes a cart of merchandise through Wal-Mart? After all, the
American Academy of Pediatrics recommends that breastfeeding
commence as soon as babies show signs of hunger.' Indeed,
breastfed babies need to be fed eight to ten times daily.2 To com-
plicate matters, breastfeeding should be free of interruptions and
distractions.3 Inevitably, breastfed babies will demand feeding at
inopportune moments.
If privacy is a concern, a mother may search for a secluded place
to breastfeed. However, if she heeds the advice of the American
Academy of Pediatrics, she will look for a convenient place to
breastfeed as soon as possible. Any interruption, including a request
to move the breast-feeding session, may affect the infant's ability to
retain the milk.4 Such a request is an unwarranted intrusion upon an
intimate moment.
5
1. Am. Academy of Pediatrics, Health Topic: Breastfeeding, at http://
www.aap.org/healthtopics/breastfeeding.cfin (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
2. Id., at http://www.aap.org/healthtopics/breastfeeding.cfm (last visited
Mar. 9, 2005).
3. See id., at http://www.aap.org/healthtopics/breastfeeding.cfi1 (last visi-
ted Mar. 9, 2005).
4. Interruptions and other distractions increase the likelihood that an infant
will spit up or hiccup during breast-feeding. See id., at http://www.aap.org/
healthtopics/breastfeeding.cfm (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
5. Breast-feeding fosters a special bond between mother and child. Id., at
http://www.aap.org/healthtopicsibreastfeeding.cfm (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
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Federal courts sitting in diversity need not worry about
interrupting intimate moments when they decide matters of state law.
However, if they impose uniquely federal perspectives on state law
issues they may also be labeled unwelcome intruders.6  For that
reason, proper diversity practice requires federal courts to apply state
law "in the same manner as would a court of the state whose law
applies." 7 When state law is "unclear or unsettled," certification to
the state's highest court "enables a federal court sitting in diversity
definitively to obtain and properly to apply state law." But what
approach is a federal court to take when certification is not man-
dated, and federal precedent appears to supply the answer to a
question of state law?
Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores forced the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals to resolve that dilemma.9 Three breast-feeding women
brought the case in 1999 after Ohio Wal-Mart employees restricted
their breastfeeding to Wal-Mart restrooms at three distinct stores on
separate occasions. 10 The court decided the case on June 30, 2004,11
and held that breast-feeding restrictions in Ohio's places of public
accommodation do not "amount" to sex discrimination. 12
In so holding, the Sixth Circuit interpreted the text and history of
Ohio Revised Code Section 4112.02(G) ("Ohio's public accommo-
dation statute"). 13 The court concluded that the statute (1) does not
protect pregnancy-related activities such as breastfeeding and (2)
should be analyzed according to Title VII's comparability test.14
6. See Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of
State Law to State Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS.
157, 168-69(2003).
7. Peter Jeremy Smith, The Anticommandeering Principle and Congress 's
Power to Direct State Judicial Action: Congress's Power to Compel State
Courts to Answer Certified Questions of State Law, 31 CONN. L. REV. 649,
654-55 (1999).
8. Id. at 654-56.
9. Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, 374 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2004).
10. Id. at 430
11. Id. at 428.
12. Id. at 430.
13. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (Anderson 2004).
14. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 436-37. Under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, it is unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire, discharge or
otherwise discriminate against any individual "with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
2320
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According to the court, a Title VII analysis also fails to protect
breastfeeding because restrictions aimed at the activity do not treat
one sex differently than another. 15 As a result, when Ohio Wal-
Marts inform their breast-feeding female customers that they may
only breastfeed in the stores' restrooms, they do not engage in sex
discrimination.16 Further, even though breast-feeding women engage
in an activity in which only women may participate, 17 places of
public accommodation that restrict it do not treat women differently
than men. '
8
Yet in Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, the Sixth Circuit did much
more than hold that a place of public accommodation may proscribe
what is appropriate conduct for breast-feeding women. 19 The court
also concluded that it sat at a legal crossroads where state discrimi-
nation statutes and federal breast-feeding precedent meet.20 In inter-
preting Section 4112 of Ohio's Revised Code, also known as Ohio's
Civil Rights statute,2' it found that the statute did not sufficiently
define the scope of sex discrimination in places of public accommo-
dation.22 As a result, the court turned to federal law for guidance.23
In the context of federal employment law under Title VII,
pregnancy discrimination constitutes sex discrimination. 24 Breast-
feeding restrictions, however, do not amount to discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy for federal purposes. 25 This limited definition of
sex discrimination guided the court's assessment of Ohio's public
accommodations statute.
26
This Comment first provides a background of the facts and
procedural history of Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores. Second, it
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000-
2(a)(1) (2000).
15. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 437.
16. See id.
17. Of course, men may administer breastmilk through bottles, but only
women's bodies can produce breastmilk and directly breast-feed a child.
18. See Derungs, 374 F.3d. at 437.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 434.
21. Id. at 436 n.7.
22. See id. at 436-37.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 439.
26. See id. at 435-39.
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summarizes the Sixth Circuit's decision and reasoning. Third, it
argues that the court's unwarranted extension of federal analysis into
Ohio's public accommodation statute renders its statutory construc-
tion unpersuasive. It concedes that the Sixth Circuit's analysis aligns
with federal employment law interpreting breast-feeding restrictions.
It proposes, however, that the Ohio Supreme Court should have
decided whether the federal analysis extends to Ohio's public
accommodations statute. Finally, the Comment concludes that the
Sixth Circuit's analysis intrudes upon state prerogative and stymies
the natural expansion of sex discrimination protection.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF
DERUNGS V. WAL-MART STORES
A. Breastfeeding in Public: Wal-Mart's Restrictions
Breastfeeding is controversial. To begin with, there is the baby
formula versus breast milk dilemma.27 Even after that conundrum is
resolved, controversy persists. Mothers who choose to breastfeed
must also confront a portion of American society uneasy at the sight
of women breastfeeding in public.28 In fact, American women have
been asked to stop breastfeeding in malls, casino restaurants, zoos,
public pools, and the children's section of a Borders bookstore.29 In
certain settings, the request may include an option: you may either
breastfeed in our restroom, or leave. 30
In April of 1997, 28-year-old Dana Derungs brought her six-
week-old son Devin along when she went to an Ohio Wal-Mart in
search of diapers. 31 The Wal-Mart journey was Devin's first trip
27. While most experts support the choice of breastmilk over formula,
"scare stories" about breastmilk contaminated with environmental pollutants
may cause new mothers to reconsider breast-feeding. Christine Gross-Loh,
Don't Trash Our Bodies! Researching Breastmilk Toxins, MOTHERING, Jan. 1,
2004, at 54.
28. See Jennifer Joseph, Let Them Eat... Publicly: Women Sue Wal-Mart
Over Breastfeeding (Apr. 9, 1999), http://www.snellen.iweb.nl/f4f/000409.htm
(last visited Mar. 12, 2005).
29. Nancy M. Solomon, Women-Health: Breastfeeding in Public Is a Basic
Civil Right (Aug. 9, 2002), http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfin/dyn/
aid/997. The Borders bookstore incident is discussed below. See discussion
infra Part V.
30. See Joseph, supra note 29.
31. Id.
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outside the home.32  As Derungs shopped and pushed her cart
through Wal-Mart, Devin started to cry.3 She located a bench near
the women's dressing room, deciding it was an acceptable place to
sit and breastfeed her child.34 Before she could begin, a Wal-Mart
employee informed Derungs that she could only breastfeed in the
store's restroom,35 or outside. 36 Derungs disagreed, and asked the
employee if she would find it acceptable to eat lunch in a restroom.
37
Derungs did not persuade the employee to allow her to breastfeed
somewhere other than a restroom. As a result, she left the store in
tears.
39
Six months later, Jennifer Gore had a similar experience while
waiting in a lay-away line at a Wal-Mart in Trotwood, Ohio.40 While
in line, Gore's son Austin began to cry.41 She silenced his cries by
breastfeeding him.42 Her breastfeeding was so discreet that a Wal-
Mart clerk asked Gore how she was able to make her son stop
crying.43 After Gore truthfully explained her technique, the clerk
informed her that she could breastfeed in the restroom or leave the
store.
44
Two weeks after her incident, Derungs and eighty others
picketed the Wal-Mart that would not let her breastfeed outside of
the women's dressing room.45 For two years Derungs tried to elicit
an apology from Wal-Mart.46 She also encouraged the company to
adopt a breast-feeding-friendly policy.47 Wal-Mart did not apologize
and never adopted a suitable policy.4 s
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, 374 F.3d 428, 430 (6th Cir. 2004).
37. See Joseph, supra note 29.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430.
41. See Mary McCarthy, Mons Need Law Making it Legal to Breast-Feed
in Public, DAYTON DAILYNEWS, Apr. 7, 1999, at lB.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430.
45. See McCarthy, supra note 42.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. Derungs claimed in one media source that Wal-Mart's failure to
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In 1999, Derungs and Gore filed suit in Ohio state court.4 9 They
claimed Wal-Mart discriminated against them on the basis of their
sex.50  Specifically, they alleged that Wal-Mart violated Ohio's
public accommodation statute when it refused to allow them to
breastfeed wherever they pleased. 51 On May 3, 1999, Wal-Mart
removed the action to the District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio on diversity of citizenship grounds.52
B. The District Court Dismisses Plaintiffs 'Statutory Claims
In district court, Wal-Mart moved for partial summary judgment
on plaintiffs' sex and age discrimination claims that alleged violation
of Ohio's public accommodation statute.53 On September 26, 2000,
the district court granted Wal-Mart's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, dismissing plaintiffs' statutory claims.54 The court held
that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Wal-Mart's breast-feeding
restrictions constituted sex or age discrimination under the statute. 55
1. The District Court Held that the Application of Ohio's Public
Accommodation Statute was one of First Impression
In its analysis of Ohio's public accommodation statute, the court
first framed the issue as whether breast-feeding prohibitions in a
place of public accommodation constituted sex or age discrimi-
apologize or adopt a breast-friendly policy motivated her decision to sue,
because, in her words, "I don't want to see any other mother go through what
we went through." Id.
49. The complaint was amended on April 19, 1999, to add Angie Baird and
her daughter as party-plaintiffs. Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430. Baird was
prohibited from breast-feeding her daughter on a bench near the Trotwood
Wal-Mart's portrait studio. Id. Like Derungs and Gore, Baird was given the
choice of either breast-feeding in the restroom or outside of the store. Id.
50. Id. Gore and Derungs' infant sons, Austin Gore and Devin Derungs,
are also named plaintiffs, and the complaint filed in Ohio State Court included
a claim of age discrimination under the same Ohio statute. Id. The complaint
additionally alleged common law claims of emotional distress, tortious
interference with parental rights and loss of consortium. Id.
51. Id.
52. Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, 141 F. Supp. 2d 884, 884 (S.D. Ohio
2000), affid, 374 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2004).
53. Id. at 888.
54. Id. at 884.
55. Id. at 894.
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nation.56 It then labeled that issue a matter of first impression un-
decided by any federal or state court.s7 Both parties acknowledged
that no Ohio law was on point.58 The court therefore found it to be
"both appropriate and necessary to venture beyond state law to
resolve the parties' dispute."
59
2. The Court Held that Breast-Feeding Discrimination is not Sex
Discrimination under Title VII or the Ohio Statute
With no state law to aid its interpretation, the court turned to
federal case law interpreting Title VII. ° Like the Ohio statute, Title
VII prohibits sex discrimination.61 The court held that although Title
VII prohibits pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex discrimi-
nation, it does not similarly forbid breast-feeding discrimination.
62
First, the court relied on the Southern District of New York's
Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc.'s 63 Title VII analysis.64 Martinez explains
that sex discrimination is limited to conduct "'favoring men while
disadvantaging women or vice versa.' 65 According to the Martinez
court, Title VII sex discrimination requires the favoring of one sex,
and does not cover distinctions drawn using criteria immaterial to
one sex.66 In applying this logic to the present facts, the court held
that breast-feeding prohibitions do indeed differentiate between
groups.67 The prohibitions, however, merely separate breast-feeding
women from those who do not breastfeed and infants who are
breastfed from those who are not.68 The court found that this sort of
differentiation does not amount to sex or age discrimination because
56. Id. at 889.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 891.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The court also held that although Title VII does not mention age
discrimination, age discrimination under the Ohio Statute would likewise be
analyzed using Title VII case law. Id. at 891-92, 892 n.9.
62. Id. at 899 n.7.
63. See 49 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that a private em-
ployer does not engage in sex discrimination by failing to accommodate a
breast-feeding employee).
64. Derungs, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 890.
65. Id. (quoting Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 309).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 889-90.
68. Id.
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it does not distinguish between men and women, or infants and non-
infants. 69  Simply put, the court found the distinguishing charac-
teristic of breastfeeding immaterial to men and noninfants.
70
Second, again relying on Martinez, the court held that plaintiffs
also failed to establish a theory of "sex-plus" discrimination, which
requires disparate treatment based on sex, coupled with a second
trait. 71 The plaintiff in Martinez could not establish that discrimi-
nation against pumping breast milk was sex-plus discrimination.72
That is, she could not show she was "treated less favorably than
similarly situated men," because men cannot pump breast milk.73 In
relying on this part of Martinez, the court concluded that breast-
feeding discrimination will never be sex-plus discrimination because
breast-feeding women have no male sub class with which to compare
themselves.
74
Finally, the court looked to the language of the Ohio statute, and
found no reason to distinguish sex and age discrimination under the
statute from an analysis of sex discrimination under Title VII. 75 The
court, therefore, found that no claim of sex or age discrimination
existed under Ohio law.
76
69. Id. at 890. The court explained that a breast-feeding prohibition divides
people into two groups: one group contains women who breast-feed and their
breastfed children, and the second is comprised of people who do not breast-
feed and children who are not breastfed. Id. at 893. Such classification is
breast-feeding discrimination, but not sex or age discrimination, as both groups
contain women and children. Id.
70. In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),
amending Title VII's definition of sex discrimination to include discrimination
"'because of or on the basis of pregnancy, any illness arising out of and
occurring during the course of a pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions."' Id. at 890 n.7. However, even under this expanded definition,
breast-feeding discrimination is not pregnancy discrimination for purposes of
Title VII. Id.; see also Susan Huhta et al., Looking Forward and Back.- Using
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Discriminatory Gender/Pregnancy
Stereotyping to Challenge Discrimination Against New Mothers, 7 EMP. RTS.
& EMP. POL'Y J. 303, 306 (2003) (explaining that courts have rejected claims
of discrimination based on a mother's breastfeeding responsibilities despite the
PDA).
71. Derungs, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 891-92.
72. Id. at 890-91.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 891 n.8.
75. Id. at 893.
76. Id. Although plaintiffs framed the issue as one of disparate treatment,
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C. Dismissal of the Remaining Claims and Plaintiffs 'Appeal
On March 15, 2001, the District Court granted Wal-Mart's
Motion for Summary Judgment on plaintiffs' remaining common law
claims. 77 On April 11, 2001, the court entered a final judgment for
Wal-Mart, which plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit.'
78
III. THE SIXTH CIRcurr's ANALYSIS AND DECISION
The Sixth Circuit endorsed the lower court's Title VII
comparability analysis when it concluded that plaintiffs failed to
make out any legally cognizable sex discrimination claim.79 The
court also added an analysis of legislative intent and Ohio court
decisions to further justify the lower court's reliance on Title VII.
80
A. The Court Surveyed Ohio Decisions to Determine the Pertinent
Standards for Discrimination Under the Ohio Statute
The court addressed the question of whether breast-feeding
prohibitions in Ohio public accommodations constitute unlawful
discrimination. 81 It stated that this was a matter of first impression
under the Ohio public accommodations statute. 82  The court
recognized that because it had to construe a state statute, it would
need to aply the substantive law of the state in which the district
court sits. The court noted in such a situation, the decisions of the
the court also rejected any disparate impact theory of sex discrimination. Id. at
892 n.10. In so holding, the court found the statute's "[except] for reasons
'applicable alike' to all individuals" language permits discrimination in public
accommodation for "reasons applicable alike to all persons." Id. That is, the
statute does not prohibit facially neutral policies that may unintentionally
discriminate. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned, the statute does not provide
for claims which involve "the application of a facially neutral policy or
practice that has a discriminatory effect on a protected class" and does not
require proof of intent to discriminate, such as those alleging disparate impact.
Id.
77. Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, 374 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 2004).
78. The plaintiffs only appealed their claims of sex discrimination, having
voluntarily withdrawn their age discrimination claims; additionally, they did
not brief their common law claims, which were considered waived. Id. at 431
n. 1.
79. Id. at 437.
80. Id. at 437-40.
81. Id. at 432.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 433 (citations omitted).
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state's highest court are the ideal precedent. 84  If, however, the
applicable precedent is that of an intermediate court, that precedent
should control unless the state supreme court would definitely take
different action. 85 With these guidelines in mind, the court turned to
Ohio decisions interpreting the statute.86
First, the court found that both the Ohio State Legislature and
the Ohio Supreme Court have stated that the public accommodation
statute should be construed liberally.87 The court, however, found
only one Ohio Supreme Court case, Ohio Civil Rights Commission v.
Lysyj, 88 that directly interpreted it.89 The court described Lysyj as a
case in which a landlord discriminated against a white resident of a
trailer park on account of her race.90 The resident was free to
entertain white guests without reprisal but was ordered to leave the
park after entertaining a black guest.91 Further, the court repeated
Lysyj's test for unlawful discrimination under the statute, which
simply asks "whether... a place of public accommodation has
denied to any person the full enjoyment of such place for reasons not
applicable alike to all persons irrespective of race, color, religion,
national origin or ancestry." 92 The court also noted that although the
legislature later amended the statute to include sex and age discrimi-
nation, the Lysyj discrimination test is still applicable, 93 and the court
employed it in a recent Ohio appellate decision.94
Next, the court looked to lower Ohio court interpretations of the
statute. The court observed that in these decisions, the plaintiffs
could be compared to a comparable class of people. 95 Hence, a
comparability analysis was appropriate to determine whether
discrimination had occurred.9 6 For example, in Gegner v. Graham,97
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 433-34.
87. See id. at 433.
88. 313 N.E.2d 3 (Ohio 1974).
89. Derungs, 374 F.3d at 433.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d at 3).
93. Id. at 433 n.2.
94. Id. at 433 (citing Meyers v. Hot Bagels Factory, 721 N.E.2d 1068 (Ohio
1999)).
95. Id. at 434.
96. Id.
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an appellate court held that when a barbershop refused the black
plaintiff service, it plainly violated the public accommodation
statute. 98  The court noted that the Gegner plaintiff could be
compared to a comparable class of people-whites.
99
B. The Court Compared the History of Sex Discrimination
Expansion Under Federal and Ohio Law to Hold that
the Ohio Public Accommodation Statute
Does Not Protect Against Pregnancy Discrimination
The court stated that in the context of employment discrimi-
nation, Ohio courts have definitively adopted the federal courts' Title
VII analysis.'00 In the context of public accommodation discrimi-
nation, however, the application of federal law is less settled.' 0 ' The
differing language used in constructing the various subdivisions of
Ohio's Civil Rights statute further complicated the court's task.
10 2
Although subdivisions pertaining to employment discrimination
mimic the language of Title VII, as they prohibit discrimination "'on
the basis of" a certain trait, 10 3 its public accommodation section is
distinguishable. 104 That section prohibits discrimination "except for
reasons applicable alike to all persons regardless of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, disability, age or ancestry."' 1 5 The
court explained that Ohio courts have applied a Title VII analysis to
Ohio's employment discrimination statutes. 10 6 The court, however,
reasoned that the history and language of the public accommodation
statute suggests that its definition of sex discrimination is less
97. 205 N.E.2d 69 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964).
98. Derungs, 374 F.3d at 433 (citing Gegner, 205 N.E.2d at 69).
99. Id. The court also cited Meyers, in which the female plaintiff alleging
sex discrimination could be compared to a comparable class of males. Id. at
434 (citing Meyers, 721 N.E.2d at 1083). The court also recited the Meyers'
interpretation of the statute's "full enjoyment" language. Id. The Meyers court
held full enjoyment to mean "the right to purchase all services or products of a
place of public accommodation, the right to be admitted to any place of public
accommodation, and the right to have access to the services and products of
such a place in the same manner as all other customers." Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 434-37.
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expansive than Title VII's. 107
First, the court described milestones in federal sex discrimi-
nation analysis. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, including
Title VII, in 1964.108 In 1976, the Supreme Court decided General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert10 9 and employed a comparability analysis to
exclude pregnancy from Title VII's sex discrimination protection."10
In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
("PDA"), which provides that Title VII's employment sex discrimi-
nation protection includes discrimination based on "pregnancy,
childbirth and related medical conditions."' 11 In 1983, the Supreme
Court held that the PDA expressly overruled Gilbert.l12
The court then compared the fate of sex discrimination
protection under Ohio law. Ohio adopted the public accommodation
amendment to Chapter 4112 of its Revised Code before the federal
Civil Rights Act passed in 1964."l 3 In 1980, before the Supreme
Court held that the PDA overruled Gilbert, Ohio incorporated the
PDA's definition of sex discrimination into its employment discrimi-
nation code."1
4
The court found that the Ohio legislature was aware of both
Gilbert and the PDA, and made a "conscious choice" to expand its
definition of sex discrimination in the context of employment."15
Further, in the public accommodations context, the court deduced
that the Ohio legislature had the opportunity to expand the scope of
its protection, but chose not to. 1 6  The court, therefore, was
unwilling to extend protection to an activity the Ohio legislature
purposefully excluded from the scope of public accommodation
107. Id.
108. Id. at 446.
109. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
110. Derungs, 374 F.3d at 434-35.
111. Id. at 435. The PDA states that women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions must be treated the same as other
applicants and employees on the basis of their ability to work. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k) (2000).
112. Derings, 473 F.3d at 436 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 436-37.
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protection. 1 17 In so holding, the court suggested that Gilbert still
governs sex discrimination under the Ohio public accommodation
statute. 1
8
C. The Court Affirmed the District Court's Use
of a Title VII Comparability Analysis
In affirming the district court's Title VII comparability analysis,
the court emphasized that the text Ohio's statute does not prohibit
discrimination "applicable alike to all persons." 119 Rather, it
prohibits discrimination in which a comparable class of people is
treated differently. 2 ° Further, the court stated that a comparison
analysis is supported by the few Ohio cases interpreting the public
accommodation statute in the context of race and sex discrimi-
nation.' 21 Applying this standard, the court concluded that Wal-
Mart's breast-feeding prohibitions merely regulate the place and
manner of its business invitees' feeding. 22  That is, they apply a
prohibition that is applicable alike to all persons. 123
D. The Court Held that No Judicial Body has Included
Breastfeeding Within the Scope of Sex Discrimination
The court repeated its conclusion that the PDA and Title VII's
pregnancy-related sex discrimination protection are more expansive
than that afforded by the Ohio public accommodation statute.
124
Despite a more expansive definition, federal employment cases have
held that breastfeeding falls outside the scope of sex discrimination
because it does not create a comparable subclass within the opposite
sex. 125  In other words, the court held that even though a more
inclusive approach to sex discrimination is available, no judicial
117. Id. at437.
118. Seeid. at439.
119. Id. at437.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 437-38.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 439.
125. Id. at 438-39. The court emphasized that this conclusion was not
limited to federal cases decided within the Sixth Circuit, such as Wallace v.
Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1990), but included cases in
other circuits, such as Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 305(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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body has found breast-feeding prohibitions to be sex discrimi-
nation. 126
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
In its decision in Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, the Sixth Circuit
declined to take the "expansive interpretive leap," that "no judicial
body" had been willing to take of including breast-feeding
discrimination in the scope of sex discrimination. 127 As such, the
court's holding preoccupies itself with boundaries other courts have
drawn. It abandons, however, the search for the true scope of Ohio's
public accommodation statute and ignores the plight of breast-
feeding mothers and hungry infants in places of public accommo-
dation. In fact, Derungs did not ask the court the abstract question of
whether any other court had taken the leap of protecting breast-
feeding. Rather, Derungs asked whether the courts of Ohio would
interpret the statute to allow women like Dana Derungs to breastfeed
in a place other than a restroom.
The Sixth Circuit's narrow interpretation of Ohio's public
accommodation statute is itself an unpersuasive approach to that
question. It relies on inapplicable precedent and misconstrues Ohio
law. The Ohio Supreme Court could have provided a more accurate
assessment of Dana Derungs' plight. The issue at hand was an open
question of state law; therefore, certification to the Supreme Court of
Ohio was the most appropriate response under the circumstances. 128
A. The Court's Narrow Construction of the
Public Accommodation Statute is Unpersuasive
In holding that the Ohio legislature did not intend to protect
against breast-feeding discrimination in places of public accommo-
dation, the court relies on inapplicable federal law' 29 and mis-
construes Ohio's test for public accommodations discrimination.
Both approaches unnecessarily narrow the scope of Ohio's sex
discrimination protection.
126. Derungs, 374 F.3d at 439.
127. Id.
128. See OHIO Sup. CT. PRAC. R. 18 (2004) (describing when a state law
question may be certified to the Ohio Supreme Court).
129. See supra Part IV.A. 1.
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1. Federal Employment Law Should Not Control
the Scope of Ohio's Public Accommodation Statute
The Sixth Circuit's narrow construction of the public
accommodation statute begins with a discussion of Ohio's em-
ployment discrimination statute. 130 That statute expanded the
definition of sex discrimination to provide for protection against
pregnancy discrimination. 131 The court describes the Ohio legis-
lature's decision to expand the definition of discrimination in
employment as a "conscious choice,"' 132 that signals an awareness of
the 1978 PDA, in which Congress similarly expanded Title VII's sex
discrimination definition. 133  The language used to expand the
definition in the employment context is identical to that of the PDA
and came a mere two years after the PDA. 134 Therefore, the court
reasoned, the Ohio legislature had the opportunity to similarly
expand its definition of sex discrimination in the public accommo-
dation context, but declined the chance. 135  Again, the court
characterized this perceived legislative decision as a purposeful
choice. 1
36
The court is justified in comparing Ohio's employment
protection with federal Title VII employment protection. 13  Yet, its
negative inference of legislative intent in the context of Ohio's public
accommodation statute lacks any mention of legislative history.
138
Indeed, the differences between the employment and public
accommodation sections are more informative than their purported
similarities. The Ohio legislature used different language in
constructing the two. 139 If the word choice differs, the intent behind
130. Derungs, 374 F.3d at 436-37.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 436.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 437.
136. Id. at 436.
137. Ohio's Supreme Court "adopted the federal courts' Title VII analysis
when deciding employment discrimination claims under the Ohio Civil Rights
statute." Id. at 434.
138. See id. at 436-37. In fact, the court may have had no legislative history
to which to turn. See Max Kravitz, Ohio's Administrative License Suspension:
A Double Jeopardy and Due Process Analysis, 29 AKRON L. REv. 123, 154
(1996) (stating that Ohio "does not record its legislative history").
139. Derungs, 374 F.3d at 434.
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the two sections may differ as well. Therefore, although the
employment section reflects an awareness of federal law, the public
accommodation section might not.14
0
In fact, the public accommodation section may protect against a
greater range of discrimination than the employment section does.'
4 1
For example, protection against breast-feeding discrimination may be
implied by the public accommodation statute. Perhaps the Ohio
Legislature declined to apply the expanded definition of sex
discrimination to that context because it had no need to state the
obvious. Although the actual intent of the Ohio Legislature cannot
be pinpointed, 142 Ohio's definition of sex discrimination is at least
potentially broader than the federal one.
Notions of state sovereignty buttress the idea that discrimination
protection is plausibly broader at the state level.143 Under a theory
that supports state independence, states serve as "laboratories for the
development of new social, economic, and political ideas."'' 44  In
fact, state courts have found state constitutional rights beyond those
protected by the federal government. 145  In that context, federal
legislation that preempts state law limits state experimentation in
regards to individual liberties. 146 Federal courts that limit the scope
of states' discrimination protection similarly limit state experimen-
tation. Further, they preempt state protection that goes beyond
federal protection.
Indeed, public accommodation law may be the better context in
which to expand sex discrimination protection beyond that afforded
140. On at least one occasion, the Ohio Legislature's civil rights protection
preceded any similar move by Congress. See id. at 437 (noting that the Ohio
Legislature adopted its Civil Rights statute before Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act in 1964).
141. The plaintiffs argued that the public accommodation statute did not
require a comparability analysis. Id. Rather, they asserted it was unique and
more expansive than Ohio's employment discrimination protection because the
public accommodation statute "precludes discrimination 'except for reasons
alike to all persons."' Id.
142. See Kravitz, supra note 139.
143. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA.
L. REv. 499 (1995) (proposing that federalism be viewed as empowering rather
than limiting various levels of government).
144. Id. at 529 (citing Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742, 787-88 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part)).
145. Id. at 538.
146. See id.
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by federal law. Basic differences between the workplace and a place
of public accommodation support varying the discrimination
protection afforded to each. For example, a place of public
accommodation may face fewer challenges than a workplace in
accommodating breast-feeding needs. A lactating employee may
require daily accommodations that range from breast-feeding rooms
to breast-feeding breaks. 147  Those accommodations will be
necessary until she weans her infant. Absent legislation, individual
employers have little short-term economic incentive to accommodate
breast-feeding employees.14
8
In contrast, a visitor to a place of public accommodation
requires relatively less adjustment. For example, Jennifer Gore
wanted to breastfeed in a lay-away line. Gore's accommodation
requires no adjustment at all; her breastfeeding went unnoticed until
Gore herself mentioned it to an inquisitive Wal-Mart clerk.
149
Similarly undemanding, Dana Derungs merely needed to sit on a
bench outside of a dressing room for one breast-feeding session.
150
A discrete instance of accommodation would have sufficed to placate
her. That accommodation would have permitted Derungs to quickly
feed her son and return to shopping. Wal-Mart would have been
rewarded with a satisfied customer likely to return.
Several state statutes may reflect the inherent differences
between accommodating breast-feeding women at work and
accommodating them in places of public accommodation. For
example, a Connecticut statute considers breast-feeding restrictions
in public accommodation to be discrimination.' 5 ' In New York,
interference with breast-feeding is a civil rights violation.'
52
However, although both Connecticut and New York afford breast-
147. See Hilary Von Rohr, Recent Development, Lactation Litigation and
The ADA Solution: A Response to Martinez v. NBC, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
341, 343-44 (2000) (describing Minnesota's breast-feeding protections, which
require private employers to "set aside a private spot" for nursing mothers
"who want to pump milk during unpaid breaks").
148. See Elissa A. Goodman, Note, Breastfeeding or Bust: The Need for
Legislation to Protect a Mother's Right to Express Breast Milk at Work, 10
CARDOzO WOMEN's L.J. 146, 149 (2003).
149. See supra notes 41-45.
150. See Joseph, supra note 29.
151. Von Rohr, supra note 148, at 343 n.13 (citing 1997 Conn. Acts 97-210
(Reg. Sess.).
152. Id. at 343.
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feeding some protection, neither extend this protection to the
workplace. 153 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit's assumption that Ohio's
public accommodation statute offers no more protection than does its
employment counterpart is at least questionable, and renders its
statutory analysis unpersuasive.
2. A Comparability Analysis is not the Definitive Test for
Public Accommodations Discrimination in Ohio.
The court relies on the comparability analysis used in federal
employment law to conclude that because no comparable class of
men is favored over breast-feeding women, breast-feeding
restrictions are not sex discrimination. 54  Relying on the Ohio
Supreme Court's Lysyj decision, however, the court also finds that
Ohio's public accommodation statute mandates the same sort of
analysis. 55  This conclusion misconstrues the only case directly
interpreting Ohio's public accommodation statute.156
The court repeats Lysyj's discrimination test.'57 The court,
however, manipulates Lysyj to resemble other Ohio cases in which
the court compared plaintiffs to a comparable class of people who
were not discriminated against.158 The court describes Lysyj as a
case in which "the discrimination at issue... was based on the fact
that a white resident was free to entertain white guests without
reprisal, but when the guest was black, the resident was ordered to
leave the trailer park.' 59 That description suggests that the black
guest can be compared to a class comprised of white guests who did
not face discrimination.
The language of Lysyj itself does not suggest such an obvious
resort to a comparability analysis. The defendant denied the Lysyj
plaintiff the full enjoyment of the public accommodation at issue
153. Id. at 344.
154. See supra Part HI.C. The problems associated with a federal analysis in
the context of Ohio's public accommodation statute are discussed above. See
supra Part IV.A; see also Part IV.B. 1.
155. See supra Part III.A.
156. See Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, 374 F.3d 428, 433 (6th Cir. 2004).
157. See supra text accompanying note 91.
158. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 433-34. The court lumps Lysyj with Meyers
and Gegner, two Ohio appellate decisions that employed a comparability
analysis. Id.
159. Id. at 433.
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because "she was white and was entertaining someone who was
black."'160 The comparable class consists of white people that do not
entertain black guests. Yet a restriction that divides white people
into two categories is not per se racial discrimination. Still, Lysyj
held that the restriction was unlawful discrimination that violated
Ohio's public accommodation statute.
161
This alternative reading of Lysyj does not suggest that Ohio's
public accommodation statute precludes a comparability analysis.
Rather, it proposes that Lysyj does not require that plaintiffs have a
class with which to compare themselves to successfully allege
unlawful discrimination. Lysyj endorses a flexible approach,
liberally construing Ohio's public accommodation amendments to
"effectuate the legislative purpose and fundamental policy implicit in
their enactment, and to assure that the rights granted by the statutes
are not defeated by overly restrictive interpretation."' 62 With this
mandate in mind and in the context of race discrimination, Lysyj held
that the public accommodation statute applies to "indirect
discrimination against a person on the basis of the race or color of his
associates." 1
63
For sex discrimination claims, a less restrictive reading of the
statute supports applying it to discrimination against a person on the
basis of sex associated with the activity in which he or she is
engaged. Although breast-feeding restrictions do not affect all
women, it is an activity associated with women. When Wal-Mart
employees targeted Derungs and Gore, they attacked two women
who wanted to engage in an activity only women can undertake. The
spirit and language of Lysyj suggest that breastfeeding should not be
unnecessarily excluded from the statute's scope and, more im-
portantly, that the rights of breast-feeding women should not be so
easily defeated.
B. The Ohio Supreme Court was the Proper Authority to
Construe the Ohio Public Accommodation Statute
In Derungs, the Sixth Circuit decided an issue of first
impression complicated by a lack of applicable Ohio Supreme Court
160. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d 3, 6 (Ohio 1974).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 7-8.
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precedent and the questionable application of federal law in the
context of public accommodation discrimination. 16 4  The court
unearthed the "likely legislative intent" of the public accommodation
statute from shallow ground. 165  The court worried about un-
necessarily expanding the legislature's definition of sex discrimi-
nation. If the court were truly concerned, however, it should also
have worried about unnecessarily narrowing the definition. Instead
of divining the intent of Ohio's legislature, the court should have
looked to the Ohio Supreme Court for an authoritative response to
the precise question presented.
1. Ohio Supreme Court Practice Rule 18
Allows for Federal Courts to Certify a
Question of Ohio law to the Ohio Supreme Court
Pursuant to Ohio Supreme Court Practice Rule 18,166 a federal
court may certify a question of Ohio law to the Ohio Supreme Court
when: (1) a question of Ohio law may be determinative of the
proceeding, and (2) there is no controlling Ohio Supreme Court
precedent on the question. 167 In Cheek v. Industrial Power Coatings,
Inc.,168 a federal district court certified a question pertaining to
individual liability under the Ohio Civil Rights statute's employment
discrimination provisions to Ohio's Supreme Court. 16 9 The district
court's certification was appropriate because its question met the
criteria of the certification rule. 70 In addition, five District Courts
had addressed the issue of individual liability under the Act and
reached different conclusions. 171
In Derungs, the construction of the Ohio public accommodation
statute was the only question before the court. 17 2 Further, the court
164. Derungs, 374 F.3d at 434.
165. Id. at 436-37.
166. OHIO SUP. CT. PRAC. R. 18.
167. OHIO SUP. CT. PRAC. R. 18(1). Federal courts may take such action sua
sponte. See Cochran, supra note 6, at 195-96.
168. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23340, at *1 (W.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 1997).
169. See id. The Cheek court certified the question of whether Ohio Revised
Code sections 4112.01(A)(2), 4112.02(A) and 4112.99 make an individual
employee personally liable for employment discrimination when that employee
is not otherwise deemed an employee under the statute. Id.
170. See id. at *3.
171. Id.
172. Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, 374 F.3d 428, 432 (6th Cir. 2004).
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acknowledged that although one Ohio Supreme Court case directly
interpreted the statute,"' that decision preceded the statute's
inclusion of sex discrimination protection. 174  The court also
conceded that Ohio courts had not considered whether to apply Title
VII to Ohio's public accommodation statute. 17 5 The question facing
the Sixth Circuit satisfied the two-prong requirement of Ohio's
certification rule and therefore should have taken advantage of it.
Instead, the court relied on federal employment precedent to evaluate
a controversy involving a breast-feeding mother's shopping trip to an
Ohio place of public accommodation. As a result, the law used was
both practically and philosophically distinct from the context at hand.
Although district courts have yet to reach different conclusions
on the question of whether breastfeeding is a protected activity under
Ohio's public accommodation statute, certification is no less
appropriate than it was in Cheek. Ohio's certification rule does not
require that district courts differ before invoking certification. 176 in
fact, in the absence of federal decisions, certification is even more
suitable so that a federal court is not left to guess at the correct
interpretation of a rarely construed state statute.
2. Certification of the Question Would
Avoid a Misinterpretation of the Statute
The advantages of certification as opposed to federal speculation
on state law issues are many. The Supreme Court has explained that
allowing a federal court faced with a novel state-law question to put
the question before the state's highest court increases the assurance
"of gaining an authoritative response."' 77  Other advocates have
argued that:
Certification places state law issues before state court
judges with greater competence in state law .... When
state courts decide these issues, that process avoids the dual
173. Id. at 433.
174. Id. at 433 n.2.
175. Id. at 435.
176. See OHIO Sup. CT. PRAC. R. 18. Despite the clarity of the certification
rule, districts have elaborated on other factors to justify sending an issue to the
Ohio Supreme Court. See Cochran, supra note 6, at 201-02 (describing
additional factors developed by federal courts that influence the decision to
certify to the Ohio Supreme Court).
177. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997).
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dangers of federal court speculation and federal court
imposition of uniquely federal perspectives that lead to
misinterpretation of state law issues. Having state judges
act as the state law decisionmakers promotes federalism
because it serves to allocate and share 1judicial power
between the state and federal court systems.
All of the preceding arguments suggest that certification would have
better resolved the court's question.
First, the Ohio Supreme Court is more familiar with, and
therefore more competent in Ohio law. If a court analogizes
breastfeeding under the public accommodation statute to
breastfeeding under federal employment law, the Ohio Supreme
Court is in the best position to so hold. The Sixth Circuit relied
heavily on the fact that Ohio courts use Title VII analyses in
employment discrimination cases. 179 The decision, however, to use
federal law as a model for employment discrimination cases is not a
necessary one, but rather the result of thoughtful analysis by the Ohio
Supreme Court.' 80 A federal court cannot know what the Ohio
Supreme Court would do in the very different context of sex
discrimination in public accommodation. 18 It should not guess.
Second, the court risks misinterpreting the Ohio statute because
it imposes a federal perspective on a state law issue. The court
narrowly construed the scope of Ohio's public accommodation
statute by comparing its history and language to that of federal sex
discrimination protection. 8 2 This is appropriate in the employment
178. Cochran, supra note 6, at 168 (footnotes omitted). Certification advo-
cates also argue that the process promotes judicial efficiency by avoiding the
delays of abstention. Id. at 168-69.
179. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., In State ex rel. Republic Steel Corp. v. Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n, 339 N.E.2d 658 (Ohio 1975) (explaining that because Title VII and
Ohio Revised Code section 4112.05(B) emanated from similar statutory
frameworks and were phrased in analogous language, applying a Title VII
rationale to the code section was appropriate).
181. But cf Richard B. Saphire, The Ohio Constitution-Then and Now: An
Examination of the Law and History of the Ohio Constitution on the Occasion
of its Bicentennial, Ohio Constitutional Interpretation, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
437 (2004) (recognizing that despite federal shortcomings in regards to
individual rights, the promise of the Ohio Constitution, as articulated by the
Republic Steel Corp. court, has not been fully realized).
182. See supra Part III.A-C.
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context because Ohio courts have already taken that same step. In
public accommodation sex discrimination law, Ohio courts have not
adopted a federal analysis. The court imposed a federal perspective
into an area of state law in which Ohio courts may choose to take a
different approach.
In fact, when issues arise within a context in which federal
courts have already spoken, Ohio courts will not necessarily answer
a question of state law in the same manner. In Direct Plumbing
Supply Co. v. City of Dayton,'83 the Ohio Supreme Court recognized
that Ohio law often parallels its federal counterpart.' 84 The same
court, however, also stated that if federal law threatens to limit
individual rights, Ohio state courts will resort to the guarantees of the
Ohio Constitution to protect them. 185  In the face of a federal
"narrowing" of individual rights, the court emphasized that Ohio is a
"sovereign state" whose Bill of Rights and its correspondent
fundamental guaranties "have undiminished vitality.' ' 186  Certifi-
cation would allow the Ohio Supreme court to decide whether Ohio
will assert its sovereignty in the context of sex discrimination.
Finally, the court's actions do not support comity between
federal and state courts. The court decides an issue of Ohio law on
its own, leaving the Ohio courts merely to observe a novel construc-
tion of their state's statute. This move runs the risk of implanting
federal policy into state law.
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
In Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, the Sixth Circuit was unwilling
to take what it considered the "expansive interpretive leap" of
including breast-feeding restrictions within the scope of sex
discrimination. 87 The court justified its restrictive reading as one
consistent with other courts' holdings. The negative impact of its
holding, however, far outweighs the benefit of consistency. First, the
court's failure to consider the progress made by those legislatures
that have expanded sex discrimination protection eviscerates such
legislative action. Second, the holding encourages other federal
183. 38 N.E.2d70 (Ohio 1941).
184. Id.
185. Id. at73.
186. Id.
187. Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, 374 F.3d 428,439 (6th Cir. 2004).
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courts to guess at a state legislature's intent rather than certify the
issue to the appropriate authority-a state's highest court. Finally,
the court's holding perpetuates illogical restrictions on the scope of
sex discrimination.
A. The Court's Holding Eviscerates State Legislative Action
The court misinterprets the importance of the fact that courts
have not expanded the scope of sex discrimination. Legislatures are
not necessarily as restrictive. For example, since 1997, a mother in
Califomia may breastfeed in any public location "where the mother
and child are authorized to be present."' 88 Nevertheless, on March 6,
1999, a clerk at Glendale's Borders bookstore told Kerry Madden-
Lunsford that she could not breastfeed her daughter under her
sweater in the Borders children's section. 189 The store's manager
informed Madden-Lunsford that she could either nurse in the
bathroom or leave. 190 Madden-Lunsford held a press conference to
announce that she would sue. 191 At that conference, the store's
general manager apologized and explained that the employees who
addressed Madden-Lunsford were unaware that their actions violated
California law.192 The case settled by July 29, 1999.9' Madden-
Lunsford herself was "heartened" that Borders recognized its mistake
and rectified the situation.
194
The settlement of that case suggests that in jurisdictions that
protect breastfeeding, the absence of judicial decisions repeating as
much should not be held to mean that no such protection exists. In
states such as California, the protection may be so obvious that a
violating store has no choice but to apologize for its conduct,
acknowledge the law protecting breastfeeding, and quickly settle any
suit. Therefore, when the Sixth Circuit mentions that no other court
has protected breastfeeding, it forgets that court intervention may be
preempted. The lack of judicial decisions protecting breastfeeding in
188. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.3 (Deering 2004).
189. See Woman Sues Over Breast-Feeding Incident, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29,
1999, at 4B.
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. See id.
193. See Woman Settles Rights Suit Over Breast-Feeding, L.A. TIMES, July
29, 1999, at 4B.
194. See id.
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fact may not reflect a legislative failure to protect the activity. When
the court ignores this sort of legislative action it weakens the impact
of legislative progress.
Further, the court's decision sends a strange message to state
legislatures. The court's retelling of Ohio's legislative history
suggests the following scenario: a legislature that expands the scope
of sex discrimination, and happens to do so after a similar federal
expansion, will have its intent interpreted as a conscious adoption of
the federal expansion. Next, its intent will be imputed to other
contexts. If the language it used in one expanded area is not
mimicked in another, the absence of similar language will be held to
indicate a lack of similar intent.
Therefore, although a legislature may have contemplated a more
expansive understanding of sex discrimination that includes breast-
feeding discrimination in one context, if it failed to mimic the
language of the PDA, the Sixth Circuit will find the legislature did
not intend such expansion. Consequently, although state legislatures
may have intended to create claims for breast-feeding women under
statutes such as those prohibiting discrimination in public accommo-
dation, such claims will be extinguished absent a showing of a very
specific sort of legislative intent.
By informing legislatures that their actual intent may be ignored
if it is not explicit, the Sixth Circuit interferes with the legislative
process. State legislatures should not be forced to model their
statutes after a federal counterpart to ensure accurate interpretations
by federal courts. Legislative attempts at an expansion of sex
discrimination protection should not be hindered by federal courts
unfamiliar with a state legislature's intent.
B. The Court's Holding Encourages Other
Federal Courts to Guess at a State Legislature's Intent
The court's unnecessary and restrictive construction of Ohio's
statute encourages lower federal courts to engage in similar guess-
work rather than take advantage of certification to a state's highest
court. By robbing state supreme courts of their proper role, the Sixth
Circuit emboldens federal courts to construe all ambiguous state
statutes using loosely similar federal precedent. As a result, federal
courts may impose federal standards into inappropriate state-law
contexts.
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In fact, a district court recently cited Derungs.195 The court in
that case does little more than quote Derungs recitation of Erie's
mandate, that is, "when a federal court interprets state law, the
substantive law of the state in which the district court sits must be
applied."'196 The concern, however, is that district courts may
venture deeper into Derungs' reasoning and inappropriately
substitute certification with federal interpretation. Consequently, the
federal guesswork this Comment fears most may become
increasingly common.
C. The Court's Holding Illogically Halts the
Expansion of Sex Discrimination Protection
The court's logic is consistent with that of most courts, which
generally concede that the scope of the PDA protects pregnancy-
related medical conditions, but insist that breastfeeding is not such a
condition. 197 Its holding creates additional precedent to justify an
illogical restriction. After all, if the PDA provides broad protection
to pregnant women, and discrimination based on pregnancy is sex
discrimination, why are courts reluctant to find that breastfeeding, a
condition resulting from pregnancy, is pregnancy discrimination?'"
In fact, the court discourages what is the natural expansion of
sex discrimination protection. In certain contexts, the concept that
pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination may be naturally
extended to find that breast-feeding discrimination is also sex
discrimination. 199 Both pregnancy and breastfeeding are "quasi-
voluntary conditions... exclusively linked to women's bodies," and
the "burden and benefit" of women alone.
20 0
Indeed, when Congress passed the PDA and overruled Gilbert, it
acknowledged that discrimination is often indirect.20 1 The PDA's
195. See Allison v. Pepsi Bottling Group, No. 5:03-CV-244, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26249, at *6-*7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2004).
196. Id. at *6 n.6.
197. Von Rohr, supra note 148, at 345.
198. See Goodman, supra note 149, at 158-59.
199. Danielle M. Shelton, When Private Goes Public: Legal Protection for
Women Who Breas~feed in Public and at Work, 14 LAW & INEQUALrrY 179,
199 (1995).
200. Id.
201. For example, although restrictions aimed at breast-feeding are not
necessarily aimed at women, they do indirectly affect women. See Julie
Manning Magid, Pregnant with Possibility: Reexamining the Pregnancy
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legislative background relied on Justice Brennan's Gilbert dissent.20 2
There, Justice Brennan chastised the majority for forgetting that
"'discrimination is a social phenomenon encased in a social
context.' 20 3 Further, Justice Brennan accused the court of losing
sight of Title VII's purpose when it held that discrimination based on
pregnancy is not sex discrimination. 204  Justice Brennan might
similarly criticize the use of comparability analyses to exclude
protection for activities exclusively linked to women's bodies. A
comparability approach forgets the social context in which
breastfeeding occurs.
The PDA should be used to eliminate discriminatory practices
and devices which foster "[sexually] stratified job environments to
the disadvantage of [women]." 20 5  Breast-feeding restrictions in
employment disadvantage working women, making full integration
into the working world difficult. Courts that reject adverse
employment claims based on situations related to childhood, such as
breastfeeding, strip the PDA of its purpose.20 6 To rely on such
myopic precedent extends Gilbert's influence at the expense of the
PDA's vision.
VI. CONCLUSION
In holding that Wal-Mart's breast-feeding restrictions do not
constitute sex discrimination under Ohio's public accommodation
statute, the Sixth Circuit applied a federal analysis to a state statute.
A contrary holding would have expanded sex discrimination
protection in an unprecedented manner: but it would have also
extended protection to an activity unnaturally excluded in the first
place, one which certain legislatures have already protected.
Rather than simply retracing the footsteps of federal
employment law, the court should have certified to the Ohio
Supreme Court the question of whether the Ohio public accommo-
dation statute protects breastfeeding. The Sixth Circuit was in no
Discrimination Act, 38 Am. Bus. L.J. 819, 819-20 (2001).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 819 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 159 (1976)).
204. Id. at 820.
205. Id. at 820-21 (quoting Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 160 (Stevens, J., dissenting))
(alteration in original).
206. Id. at 831-33.
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position to guess at the intent motivating the Ohio legislature's
public accommodation amendments. Ohio's Supreme Court would
have provided a more authoritative interpretation of an Ohio statute
instead of risking the imposition of a purely federal perspective.
Finally, the court's decision hinders the natural expansion of sex
discrimination protection. Its holding alerts state legislatures that no
matter how progressive their intent, it may be misconstrued by a
federal court that declines to certify the question to a state court.
This decision stymies state creativity in favor of a static vision of
federal law.
In this case, a federal court told the plaintiffs that their state
legislature did not want to include breast-feeding protection within
the scope of sex discrimination. The Sixth Circuit robbed those
plaintiffs of protection that the Ohio legislature may have intended
for them to have. Future plaintiffs may be similarly swindled by
federal courts disinclined to search beyond restrictive federal pre-
cedent for the answer to a question of state law.
Standing alone, the conclusion that breast-feeding discrimi-
nation is not sex discrimination is at least surprising. When coupled
with statutory interpretation that relies on inapplicable federal
precedent, however, the Sixth Circuit's decision becomes
implausible. Yet without knowing the Ohio's legislature's actual
intent, this Comment cannot conclude that it definitely meant to
expand the scope of sex discrimination protection. Arguably, the
legislature opened the door to such a possibility. With its Derungs v.
Wal-Mart Stores decision, the Sixth Circuit slams that door shut.
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